A person's psychological state can affect performance. One common form in which this is manifested is "choking," which is a physical response to a perceived psychological situation, usually fear of not performing well or failing. The fear response physically affects the individual: breathing gets short and muscles tighten. This may be the response to fear of performing badly on tests, on the golf course, or when speaking in public; in other words, it may occur any time that an individual's performance at some activity matters. The fear of performing badly is widespread: it is said that in ranking their fears, people put public speaking above death. 1 The response is ironic in that when performance matters, the physiological response may compromise performance. Whether it's a lawyer presenting a case to the Supreme Court, a professional golfer approaching a game-winning putt, or an academic giving a job market seminar, the probability of success diminishes if legs are trembling, hands are shaking, or breathing is difficult. 2 The fear that triggers the physiological response in a person faced with a particular activity is often related to experience and is likely to be especially strong if the person performed less than optimally at those times. Knowing that one has failed frequently at a task may make succeeding at the task in the future difficult. Stated succinctly, the likelihood of an individual's succeeding at a task may not be independent of his or her beliefs about the likelihood of success.
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1 From the Speech Anxiety Website at Rochester Community and Technical College (http://www.roch.edu/dept/ spchcom/anxiety_introduction.htm).
mance technology" whereby a person's history of successes and failures at an activity affects the probability of success in future attempts. We show that the presence of this type of interaction may induce biases in information processing similar to biases that have been identified by psychologists. These biases are sometimes seen by economists as anomalies that are difficult to reconcile with rational decision making. Rather than being a liability, in our model these biases increase an individual's welfare.
In Section I we review related literature describing the effect of psychological state on performance and systematic biases in people's decision making. In Section II we present the basic model, including the possibility that an individual's perceptions can be biased, and show in Section III the optimality of biased perceptions. We conclude with a discussion section.
I. Related Work in Psychology
We will review briefly some work done by psychologists that supports the view that an individual's psychological state affects his or her performance, as well as the evidence concerning biased perceptions.
A. Psychological State Affecting Performance
Psychological state can affect performance in different ways. Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson (1995) provide evidence that stress can impair performance. In Graduate Record Examinations, blacks and whites were given a series of difficult verbal problems to solve under two conditions: the first was described as diagnostic, to be interpreted as evaluating the individual taking the test, while the second was described as determining how individuals solved problems. Steele and Aronson interpret the diagnostic condition as putting black subjects at risk of fulfilling the racial stereotype about their intellectual ability and causing self-doubt and anxiety about living up to this stereotype. Blacks performed more poorly when stress was induced (the diagnostic condition) than under the neutral condition.
3 Aronson et al. (1999) demonstrate a similar effect in white males. When they were told prior to a test that there was a stereotype that Asian students outperform Caucasian students in mathematics, these math-proficient white males did measurably worse than students to whom this statement was not made.
Shelley E. Taylor and Jonathan D. Brown (1988) survey a considerable body of research that suggests that overly positive self-evaluation, exaggerated perceptions of mastery, and unrealistic optimism are characteristic of normal individuals and that, moreover, these illusions appear to promote productive and creative work.
There are other psychological states that can affect performance. Henry C. Ellis et al. (1997) show that mood affects subjects' ability to detect contradictory statements in written passages. They induced either a neutral or a depressed mood by having participants read aloud a sequence of 25 statements. An example of a depressed statement was "I feel a little down today," and an example of a neutral statement was "Sante Fe is the capital of New Mexico."
4 They found that those individuals in whom a depressed mood was induced were consistently impaired in detecting contradictions in prose passages. Frank McKenna and C. Lewis (1994) similarly demonstrated that induced mood affects articulation. Depressed or elated moods were induced in participants, who were then asked to count aloud to 50 as quickly as possible. Performance was retarded in the depressed group.
Nico Brand et al. (1997) demonstrate that physical reaction time is affected by induced mood. Subjects were randomly assigned to two groups, with positive mood induced in one group and negative mood in the other. Positive mood was induced by showing the Dutch subjects a seven-minute videotape consisting of fragments of the 1988 European soccer championship in which the Dutch team won the title, followed by a two-minute clip of the movie "Beethoven," including a few scenes of a puppy. Negative mood was induced by showing subjects an eight-minute clip of the film "Faces of Death," consisting of a live recorded execution (by electric chair) of a criminal.
5 Subjects with positive induced mood showed faster response times than did subjects with negative induced mood.
Simon Baker et al. (1997) also induce elated and depressed moods in subjects 6 and show that induced mood affects subjects' performance on a verbal fluency task. In addition, they measure regional cerebral blood flow using Positron Emission Tomography (PET). They find that induced mood is associated with activation of areas of the brain associated with the experience of emotion. This finding is of particular interest in that it points to demonstrable physiological effects of mood.
In our formal model below, we assume that the psychological state that affects performance of a particular task is associated with related tasks done in the past. We should point out that only the first half (approximately) of the work surveyed above can be considered as supporting our finding. We include the remaining work because it provides evidence of the broader point that we think important-that the probability that an individual will be successful at a task should not always be taken as being independent of psychological factors.
B. Biased Perception
Psychologists have compiled ample evidence that people have biased perceptions and individuals systematically evaluate themselves more highly than others do. Chris Guthrie et al. (2001) distributed a questionnaire to 168 federal magistrate judges as part of the Federal Judicial Center's Workshop for Magistrate Judges II in New Orleans in November 1999. The respondents were assured that they could not be identified from their questionnaires and were told that they could indicate if they preferred their answers not be included in the research project. Only one of the 168 judges chose not to have the answers included.
To test the relationship of the judges' estimates of their ability relative to that of other judges, they were asked the following question: "United States magistrate judges are rarely overturned on appeal, but it does occur. If we were to rank all of the magistrate judges currently in this room according to the rate at which their decisions have been overturned during their careers, [what] would your rate be?" The judges were then asked to place themselves in the quartile corresponding to their respective reversal rates: highest (Ͼ75 percent), second highest (Ͼ50 percent), third highest (Ͼ25 percent), or lowest.
The judges' answers are very interesting: 56.1 percent put themselves into the lowest quartile, 31.6 percent into the second-lowest quartile, 7.7 percent in the second-highest quartile, and 4.5 percent in the highest quartile. In other words, nearly 90 percent thought themselves above average.
These judges are not alone in overestimating their abilities. People routinely overestimate themselves relative to others in driving (Ola Svenson, 1981) , the likelihood their marriage will succeed (Lynn Baker and Robert Emery, 1993) , and the likelihood that they will have higher salaries and fewer health problems than others (Neil D. Weinstein, 1980) . Michael Ross and Fione Sicoly (1979) report that when married couples are asked to estimate the percentage of household tasks they perform, their estimates typically add up to far more than 100 percent.
People overestimate not only their likelihood of success relative to others, but also the likelihood of success in situations not involving others. When subjects are asked questions, and asked the likelihood that their answers are correct, their "hit rate" is typically 60 percent when they state that they are 90 percent certain (see, e.g., Baruch Fischoff et al., 1977 and Sarah Lichtenstein et al., 1982) .
Biases are common when in judging the relative likelihood of particular events, and many scholars have attempted to trace the source of these biases. One often-mentioned source is the overutilization of simple heuristics, such as the availability heuristic (Amos Tversky and 5 Subjects in this group were told in advance that they were free to stop the video if the emotional impact became too strong. Seven of the 20 subjects did so about halfway through the video. 6 Depressed, neutral, and elated states are induced by having subjects listen to extracts of Prokofiev's "Russia under the Mongolian Yoke" at half speed in the depressed state, "Stressbusters," a recording of popular classics in the neutral condition, and Delibes' "Coppelia" in the elated condition.
Daniel Kahneman, 1973) : in assessing the likelihood of particular events, people are often influenced by their past experiences. For example, a worker who is often in contact with jobless individuals because he is jobless himself would typically overestimate the rate of unemployment; similarly, an employed worker would typically underestimate the rate of unemployment (see Richard E. Nisbett and Ross, 1980) . In the same vein, biases in self-evaluations may be the result of particular experiences being more readily available than others: if good experiences are more easily remembered than bad ones, or if failures are to be disregarded or attributed to atypical circumstances, people tend to have overly optimistic self-evaluations (see Martin Seligman, 1990 , for more details on the connection between attributional styles and optimism).
Economists often see these biases as "shortcomings" of judgement or pathologies that can only lower the welfare of an individual. As mentioned in the introduction, in our model such biases will emerge as welfare enhancing.
II. Basic Model
We consider an agent who faces a sequence of decisions on whether to undertake a risky activity. This activity may be either a success or a failure. Consider a lawyer who is faced with a number of cases that he may accept or decline. Accepting a case is a risky prospect as he may win or lose the case. The lawyer will receive a payoff of 1 in case of success and a payoff normalized to 0 in case of failure.
Our primary departure from conventional decision theory is that we assume that the lawyer's probability of winning the case depends on his confidence: 7 if he is unsure about his abilities or anxious, he will have less chance of convincing the jury. To capture the idea that confidence affects performance in the simplest way, we identify these feelings of anxiety or self assurance with the lawyer's perception of success in previous cases. A lawyer who is more confident about his chances of success will be assumed to have greater chances of succeeding than a lawyer who is not confident.
In what follows, we present two main building blocks of our model. First we describe the risky activity, the true prospects of the agent if he undertakes it, and the effect of confidence. Second, we describe the decision process the agent follows.
A. The Risky Activity
We start by modelling confidence and its effect on performance. We make two assumptions. First, higher confidence will translate into higher probability of success. Second, confidence will depend on the agent's perception of how successful he has been in the past.
Formally, we denote the probability of success, and we take the parameter ʦ (0, 1] as a measure of the agent's confidence. We assume that ϭ 0 where 0 ʦ (0, 1). The probability 0 depends solely on the characteristics of the project being undertaken. Absent any psychological considerations, the agent would succeed with probability 0 . Lack of confidence reduces performance.
8
Note that we do not model the process by which performance is reduced. It is standard to assume that performance should depend only on the agent's actions while undertaking the project. Hence one might object that we need to explain how confidence alters the decisions made by the agent while undertaking the project. We do not, however, model these decisions. We assume the agent does not have full conscious control over all the actions that need to be undertaken and that his psychological state has an effect on these actions that is beyond his conscious control.
We now turn to modelling how confidence (or lack of confidence) arises. Various factors may contribute to decreasing confidence, such as the remembrance of past failures or the agent's perception of how likely he is to succeed. In the basic version of our model, we assume confidence depends solely on the agent's perception of the empirical frequency of past success.
Formally, we denote by s (respectively f ) the number of successes (respectively failures) the agent recalls. We explicitly allow this number to deviate from the actual number. 9 We will explain below how these data are generated. We define the perceived empirical frequency of success as ϭ s s ϩ f and we assume that confidence is a smooth and increasing function of , that is, ϭ ͑͒ where Ј Ͼ 0, (0) Ͼ 0, and, without loss of generality, (1) ϭ 1.
10
Combining the two assumptions above, we may view the probability of success as a function of the agent's perception , and define the performance function as follows:
Last, we assume that the effect of confidence on performance is not too strong, that is, that
This assumption is made primarily for technical convenience. It will be discussed below and in the Appendix. We draw the function in Figure  1 . The positive slope captures the proposal that high (respectively low) perceptions affect performance positively (respectively negatively).
Among the possible perceptions that an agent may have about the frequency of success, there is one that will play a focal role. Consider the (unique) perception * such that 11 * ϭ ͑*͒.
Whenever the agent has a perception that is below *, the objective probability of success () exceeds his perception . Similarly, whenever the agent has the perception that is above *, the objective probability of success is below his perception. At *, the agent's perception is equal to the objective probability of success. An agent who holds this perception would not find his average experience at variance with his perception.
We now turn to how the numbers s and f are generated. Obviously, there should be some close relationship between true past outcomes and what the agent perceives or recalls. In many contexts, however, the psychology literature has identified various factors, such as generation of attributions or inferences, memorability, perceptual salience, and vividness, that may affect what the agent perceives, records, and recalls, hence the data that are available to the agent.
To illustrate, for example, the role of attributions, consider the case of our lawyer. When he loses, he may think that this was due to the fact that the defendant was a member of a minority group while the jury was all white: the activity was a failure, but the reasons for the failure are seen as atypical and not likely to arise in the future. He may then disregard the event when 9 Our modelling here is similar to that of Matthew Rabin and Joel Schrag (1999) ; we discuss the relationship between the models in Section IV.
10 When no data are available, we set ϭ 1. Our results, however, will not depend on that assumption. 11 There is a unique * satisfying this equation due to our assumption that Ј ʦ [0, 1). evaluating his failure. In extreme cases, he may even convince himself that had the circumstances been "normal," he would have won the case and mentally record the event as a success.
This basic notion is not new; there is evidence in the psychology literature that people tend to attribute positive experiences to things that are permanent and to attribute negative experiences to transient effects.
12 If one gets a paper accepted by a journal, one attributes this to being a good economist, while rejections are attributed to the referee not understanding the obviously important point being made. With such attribution, successes are likely to be perceived as predicting further successes, while failures have no predictive effect.
We now formalize these ideas. We assume that after undertaking the activity, if the outcome is a failure, the agent, with probability ␥ ʦ [0, 1), attributes the outcome to atypical circumstances. Events that have been labelled atypical are not recorded. When ␥ ϭ 0, perceptions are correct, and the true and perceived frequencies of success coincide. When ␥ Ͼ 0, perceptions are biased: the agent overestimates the frequency of past success.
To assess precisely how the perception bias ␥ affects the agent's estimate of his past success rate, define the function
is essentially the proportion of recorded events that are recorded as success when the true frequency of success is and ␥ is the perception bias. True and perceived frequencies of success are random variables. Yet in the long run, as will be shown in the Appendix, their distributions will be concentrated around a single value, and a true frequency of success will translate into a perceived frequency of success
Equivalently, for the agent to perceive a success rate of in the long run, the true long-run frequency of success has to be equal to ( Figure 2 illustrates such a function with ␥ Ͼ 0. Note that with our assumptions, perceptions are optimistic: they always exceed the true frequency of past success, that is,
B. Decision Process
As described in the outline of our model above, the agent faces a sequence of decisions on whether or not to undertake a risky activity. We assume that undertaking the activity entails a cost c, possibly because of a lost opportunity. For example, in the example above, there might always be available some riskless alternative to taking on a new case, such as drawing up a will. We assume the cost c is stochastic and takes values in [0, 1] . We further assume that the random variables {c t } tϭ1 ϱ , the costs at each time t, are independent, that the support of the random variables is [0, 1] , and that at the time the agent chooses whether to undertake the activity at t, he knows the realization of c t .
To evaluate whether undertaking the project is worthwhile, the agent forms a belief p about whether he will succeed, and we assume this belief is based on the data he recollects. This can be viewed as a formalization of the availability heuristic: only the outcomes that are recollected are available to the agent. We do not model, however, the fine details of how recollections of past successes and failures are mapped into the agent's belief about the probability of success on the next try; rather, we model this process as a function p ϭ ␤͑s, f͒.
12 See, e.g., Seligman (1990) . One can think of this function as capturing the dynamic process by which an agent who is initially unsure about 0 would update his initial beliefs as he accumulates experience.
13 Alternatively, one might imagine an agent who follows a simple rule of thumb in forming beliefs. The only restrictions we place on the function ␤ are the following:
The first assumption is a statement that beliefs must lie between 0 and 1. The second assumption is an "asymptotic consistency" condition that rules out belief formation processes for which there is a permanent divergence between the agent's perceived successes and failures and his beliefs: when the number of recalled past outcomes is large, the belief of the agent must approach the perceived empirical frequency of past successes.
Under these conditions, when the data are not biased, beliefs are correct in the long run. We insist on the same conditions holding even when the data are biased, because our view is that the agent is ignorant of the fact that the process by which these data are generated might be biased and lead him to biased beliefs. 15 Having formed a belief p t about his chance of success at date t if he undertakes the activity, the agent compares the expected payoff from undertaking the activity to the cost of undertaking it. That is, the agent undertakes the activity if and only if 16 p t Ն c t .
Finally, we define the expected payoff v(p, ) to the agent who has a belief p and perception , and who does not yet know the realization of the cost of the activity:
This completes the description of the model. The key parameters of the model are the technology ٪, the belief function ␤, and the perception bias ␥. Each triplet (, ␤, ␥) induces a probability distribution over beliefs, perceptions, decisions, and outcomes. 18 We are interested in the limit distribution and the agent's expected gain under that limit distribution when the perception bias is ␥. We will verify in the Appendix that this limit distribution is welldefined. Formally, let
We are interested in the long-run payoff defined by
We will show that VЈ ϱ (0) Ͼ 0, that is, that 13 Depending on the priors of the agent and on what the agent is trying to estimate, Bayesian learning explanations for the formation of beliefs might depend on the sequence of successes and failures. To facilitate exposition, we have chosen to describe the function ␤ as a function of the aggregate numbers of recalled successes and failures only. One could alternatively consider more complicated functions determining the agent's belief about the probability of success that depend on the particular sequencing of recalled successes and failures.
14 These restrictions are in addition to the assumption that it is only the aggregate numbers of recalled successes and failures that matter. 15 We will return to this issue in Section IV and examine the case where the agent is aware that his data may be biased and attempts to correct his beliefs accordingly. 16 As mentioned above, we have not assumed that the agent knows 0 , hence he might wish to experiment. We could allow for more sophisticated rules of behavior, accounting for the fact that the agent might want to experiment for a while and undertake the activity when p t Ն t c t with t Յ 1. Our results would easily carry over to this case, as long as with probability 1 there is no experimentation in the long run: t 3 1. 17 Note that this expected utility is from the perspective of an outside observer, since it is calculated with the true probability of success, (p). From the agent's point of view, the expected value is Pr͕p Ն c͖E͓p Ϫ c͉p Ն c͔. 18 The distribution at date t also depends on the initial condition, that is, the value of confidence when no data are available (which has been set equal to 1; see footnote 10). Under the assumption that ٪ is not too steep, however, the limit distribution is independent of initial condition.
according to this criterion some bias in perceptions will make the decision maker better off.
Note that our focus on long-run payoffs implies that we do not analyze what effect biased beliefs have on the decision maker's welfare in the transition period leading up to steady state. That biases in perceptions might be welfare enhancing in transition would not be surprising; however, in our model, the decision maker typically starts with erroneous beliefs 19 and hence make poor decisions in transition. 20 Biases in perceptions could induce better decisions, because they may induce a quicker move toward beliefs that would be closer to true probability of success. We discuss this further in Section IV C.
III. The Optimality of Biased Perceptions

A. A Benchmark: The Cost of Biased Perceptions
We begin with the standard case where confidence does not affect performance, that is, the case in which ϭ 1, independently of . Our objective is to highlight the potential cost associated with biased perceptions.
The probability of success is equal to 0 . By the law of large numbers, as the number of instances where the activity is undertaken increases, the frequency of success gets close to 0 (with probability close to 1). When perceptions are correct (␥ ϭ 0), the true and perceived frequencies of past success coincide. Hence, given our assumption (iii) concerning ␤, the agent's belief must converge to 0 as well. It follows that
where g٪ is the density function for the random cost.
How do biased perceptions affect payoffs?
With biased perceptions (␥ Ͼ 0), the true frequency of success still gets close to 0 (with probability close to 1). The perceived frequency of success, however, will get close to ␥ ( 0 ), as will his belief about his chance of success. The agent will thus decide to undertake the project whenever c Յ ␥ ( 0 ). It follows that
The only effect of the perception bias ␥ is to change the circumstances under which the activity is undertaken. When ␥ Ͼ 0, there are events for which
In these events, the agent undertakes the activity when he should not do so (since they have negative expected payoff with respect to the true probability of success), and in the other events, he is taking the correct decision. So the agent's (true) welfare would be higher if he had correct perceptions. This is essentially the argument in classical decision theory that biasing perceptions can only harm agents.
B. Confidence-Enhanced Performance
When confidence affects performance, it is no longer true that correct perceptions maximize long-term payoffs. It will still be the case that agents with biased perceptions will have overly optimistic beliefs and consequently be induced to undertake the activity when they should not have. On those projects they undertake, however, their optimism leads to higher performance, that is, they have higher probability of success. We will compare these two effects and show that having some degree of optimism is preferable to correct perceptions.
The key observation (see the Appendix) is that in the long run, the perceived frequency of success tends to be concentrated around a single value, say ϱ , and the possible values of ϱ are therefore easy to characterize. The realized frequency of success t ϭ ( t ) is with high probability near ϱ ϭ ( ϱ ). True and perceived frequencies of success are thus concentrated around ϱ and ␥ ( ϱ ), respectively. The only possible candidates for ϱ must therefore satisfy
Below, we will restrict our attention to the case where there is a unique such value. Under the assumption Ј Ͻ 1, this is necessarily the case when ␥ is not too large. 21 We will discuss in the Appendix the more general case where equation (3.1) may have several solutions. Figure 3 illustrates geometrically ϱ for an agent with biased perceptions (and, consequently, optimistic beliefs).
Note that in the case that perceptions are correct, ϱ coincides with the rational belief * defined earlier, but that for an agent for whom Ј٪ Ͼ 0,
In the long run, the agent with positive perception bias thus has better performance than an agent with correct perceptions (( ϱ ) Ͼ (*)), but he is overly optimistic about his chances of success ( ϱ Ͼ ( ϱ )).
Turning to the long-run payoff, we obtain
As a benchmark, the long-run payoff when perceptions are correct is equal to
To understand how V ϱ (␥) compares to V ϱ (0), we write V ϱ (␥) Ϫ V ϱ (0) as the sum of three terms:
The first term is positive: it corresponds to the increase in performance that arises due to optimism regarding the activities that would have been undertaken even if perceptions had been correct. The second term is positive: it corresponds to the realizations of costs for which the activity is profitable to the agent only because he is optimistic. Finally, the third term is negative: it corresponds to the realizations of costs for which the agent should not have undertaken the activity and undertakes it because he is optimistic. The shaded regions in Figure 4 represent these three terms when c is uniformly distributed.
One implication of equation (3.2) is that when confidence positively affects performance (Ј Ͼ 0), some degree of optimism always generates higher long-run payoff. There are two forces operating: distorting perceptions distort beliefs-hence decisions-but they also distort the technology that maps past outcomes into future probabilities of success. The first is bad, the second is good, and there is a tradeoff. Starting at the point where perceptions are correct (␥ ϭ 0), the distortion in decisions has a second order on welfare: the distortion applies to few realizations of costs, and for these realizations, the loss is small. 22 In contrast, the improvement in the technology has a first-order effect on welfare. Formally,
C. Robustness to Alternative Assumptions
The Genesis of Confidence.-In our model, confidence depends on the agent's perception of the empirical frequency of past success. One motivation for this assumption is the idea that perceived bad average past performance would trigger anxiety, hence a decrease in performance. There are plausible alternative assumptions concerning the genesis of confidence (or lack of confidence), or more generally, how past perceptions affect current performance.
One plausible alternative assumption is that upon undertaking the project, the agent recalls a (possibly small) number of past experiences, and that recollections of failures among these past experiences decrease confidence or performance, for example because they generate unproductive intrusive thoughts. One could also imagine that recent past experiences are more likely to be recalled.
Let us give two more specific examples: (i) Suppose that upon undertaking the project, the agent recalls one experience among all recorded past experiences, and that confidence is equal to 1 if that experience was a success, and equal to 1 Ϫ ⌬ (with ⌬ ʦ (0, 1)) if that experience was a failure. Under that specification, confidence is thus a random variable that may take two values (1 or 1 Ϫ ⌬), with the higher value having probability ϭ s/s ϩ f.
(ii) Suppose that confidence depends on (and is increasing in) the fraction of successes obtained in the last T recorded experiences. Under that specification, confidence is a random variable that may take T ϩ 1 values.
The first example falls within the scope of our model, because it yields an expected performance equal to () 0 , where () ϭ 1 Ϫ ⌬ ϩ ⌬. We provide in the Appendix an alternative form of biased perception that encompasses the second example, where current performance depends on the particular history of past perceptions rather than just the summary statistic . A feature of that model is that a change in date t perceived outcome from failure to success can only increase later expected confidence. We show that our result holds with this alternative specification.
The Welfare Criterion.-As discussed above, we evaluate the agent's welfare using long-run or steady-state payoffs only. One alternative assumption is to evaluate welfare using discounted payoffs. With a discount factor sufficiently close to one, our insight would clearly remain valid.
For smaller discount factors, we would have to analyze how biased perceptions affect welfare in the transition to steady state. In transition, however, our argument does not apply. Since beliefs may not be correct in transition, the distortion in beliefs induced by biased perceptions may not be second order: depending on whether the agent is currently too optimistic or too pessimistic, the bias may either increase or reduce the period during which beliefs remain 22 We emphasize that the welfare reduction stemming from the distortion in decisions is a second-order effect only when there is initially no distortion. There are clearly cases in which nonmarginal increases in confidence can be very costly. far from the truth. Thus we cannot be assured that the improvement in technology dominates the distortion of decisions; as a result, the effect of the bias is indeterminate.
Nevertheless, if one were to evaluate welfare using discounted payoffs, it might be legitimate to allow for a bias in perception ␥ that would be time dependent. In that case, our model suggests that welfare is increased when ␥ is positive in the long run.
IV. Discussion
We have identified circumstances in which having biased perceptions increases welfare. How should one interpret this result? Our view is that it is reasonable to expect that in such circumstances agents will end up holding optimistic beliefs and the welfare that they derive when they are optimistic is greater than when their beliefs are correct.
We do not, however, conceive optimism as being the outcome of a deliberate choice by the agent. In our model, agents do not choose perceptions or beliefs. Rather, these are the product of recalled past experiences, which are themselves based on the types of attributions agents make, upon failing, for example. Our view is that there are undoubtedly limits to the extent to which perceptions can be biased, but that it is reasonable to expect that the agents' attributions adjust some so as to generate some bias in perceptions.
We have described earlier a particularly simple form of biased attribution. We do not, however, suggest that precisely this type of attributions should arise. Other types of attributions as well as other types of informationprocessing biases may lead to optimistic beliefs.
We start by providing some examples. We then question the main predictions of our model: that rational agents would persistently have biased perceptions and be persistently overconfident about their chances of success.
A. Alternative Information-Processing Biases
In the model analyzed above, the agent sometimes attributes the cause of failure to events that are not likely to occur again in the future, while he never makes such attributions in case of success (nonpermanence of failure/permanence of success). An alternative way in which an agent's perceptions may be biased is that rather than attributing failures to transient circumstances, he attributes successes to a broader set of circumstances than is appropriate; in the psychology literature, this is referred to as pervasiveness of success bias (see, e.g., Seligman, 1990) .
To illustrate this idea of pervasiveness, consider again the example of the lawyer. Suppose that cases that are available to the lawyer can be of two types: high-profile cases that will attract popular attention and low-profile cases that will not. Suppose that in high-profile cases, there will be many more people in court, including reporters and photographers, and consequently much more stress, which we assume impairs performance. Suppose that one day the lawyer wins a case when there was no such attention. Although the lawyer realizes that success would have been less likely had there been attention, he thinks, "The arguments I made were so good, I would have won even if this had been a high-profile case." In thinking this way, the lawyer is effectively recording the experience as a success whether it had been high profile or not.
23
Another channel through which beliefs about chances of success may become biased is when the agent has a biased memory technology, and, for example, tends to remember more easily past successes than past failures.
24 Optimism may also stem from self-serving bias. Such bias occurs in settings where there is not a compelling, unique way to measure success. When 23 More generally, this is an example of how inferences made at the time of the activity affect later recollection of experiences. This inability to distinguish between outcomes and inferences when one attempts to recall events constitutes a well-documented source of bias. A compelling example demonstrating this is given by Sharon L. Hannigan and Mark T. Reinitz (2001) . Subjects were presented a sequence of slides depicting ordinary routines and later received a recognition test. The sequence of slides would sometimes contain an effect scene (oranges on the floor) and not a cause scene (woman taking oranges from the bottom of pile), and sometimes a cause scene and not an effect scene. In the recognition test, participants mistook new cause scenes as old when they had previously viewed the effect.
24 See William N. Morris (1999) for a survey of the evidence that an individual's mood affects his or her recollection process.
giving a lecture, a speaker might naturally feel it was a success if the audience enthusiastically applauds. If, unfortunately, that doesn't occur, but an individual comes up to him following the lecture and tells him that it was very stimulating, he can choose that as a signal that the lecture was a "success."
B. Can a Rational Agent Fool Himself?
One prediction of our model is that when perceptions affect performance, rational agents prefer that their perceptions are biased. However, can a rational agent fool himself?
Imagine, for example, an agent who sets his watch ahead, in an attempt to ensure that he will be on time for meetings. Suppose that when he looks at his watch, the agent takes the data provided by the watch at face value. In this way, the agent fools himself about the correct time, and he easily arrives in time for each meeting. One suspects, however, that this trick may work once or twice but that eventually the agent will become aware of his attempt to fool himself and not take the watch time at face value.
There are two important differences between this example and the problems we address. First, in the example the agent actively makes the decision to "fool" himself, and sets his watch accordingly. In our model, one should not think of the agent choosing to bias his perceptions, but rather the bias in perceptions is subconscious and arises to the extent that the bias has instrumental value, that is, increases the welfare of people with the bias. The second difference is that the individual who sets his watch ahead will get constant feedback about the systematic difference between correct time and the time shown on his watch. Our model is aimed at problems in which this immediate and sharp feedback is absent. An academic giving a talk, a student writing a term paper, and a quarterback throwing a pass have substantial latitude in how they perceive a quiet reception to their talk, a poor grade on the paper, or an incompletion. Each can decide that his performance was actually reasonably good and the seeming lack of success was due to the fault of others or to exogenous circumstances. Importantly, an individual with biased perceptions may never confront the gap in the way one who sets his watch ahead would. While it may be hard for people actively to fool themselves, it may be relatively easy (and potentially beneficial) to be passively fooled.
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How easy is it to be fooled? This presumably depends on the accuracy of the feedback the agent gets about his performance. One can expect that fooling oneself is easier when the outcome is more ambiguous, because it is then easier to interpret the outcome as a success. Along these lines, putting agents in teams is likely to facilitate biased interpretations of the outcomes and make it easier for each agent to keep his confidence high: one can always put the blame on others in case of failure. 26 These observations suggest that when confidence affects performance, there may be a value to designing activities in a way that facilitates biases in information processing.
C. What If the Agent Is Aware That
Confidence Matters?
A related objection to our model might be that when forming beliefs, a more sophisticated agent would take into account the fact that the data may be biased. This would be a reasonable assumption if the agent is aware that confidence matters and understands the possible effect that this may have on his attributions. Would we still obtain optimistic beliefs (hence overconfidence) as a prediction of our model if we allowed the agent to reassess his beliefs over chances of success, to account for a possible overrepresentation of successes in the data?
The bias in perception clearly has instrumental value, but the resulting bias in belief (hence the agent's overconfidence) has no instrumental value. The agent might try reassessing his beliefs regarding chances of success to benefit from biased perceptions (through increased performance), without incurring the cost of suboptimal decision making induced by overconfidence.
These second thoughts in evaluating chances of success could limit, however, the benefit that stems from biased perception. Reevaluating his chances of success may lead the agent to reassess his perceptions over past successes and failures as well. Introspection about his beliefs may lead him to recall past failures, otherwise forgotten, leading in turn to diminished future performance. Thus, even if the agent could learn to reevaluate his chance of success in a way that maximizes long-run welfare, we should expect a reduced reevaluation that does not completely offset the bias in perception.
More formally, sophisticated agents who understand that their data may be biased might adjust their prediction of success on the next try downward, to say p ϭ ␤(s, f ), where Յ 1 captures the extent of the adjustment. (The stronger the bias, as perceived by the agent, the greater the adjustment.) As a result, the perception would differ from the belief p in the long run, and the agent's overconfidence might be reduced. The comments above, however, suggest that for these agents, performance would depend not only on first-hand perception , but also on the extent to which the agent thinks his data are biased:
where is increasing in (a larger adjustment diminishes performance). 27 We have examined the case where is set equal to 1, that is, the agent is unaware that his perceptions are biased and there is no adjustment. We note that for any fixed Ͻ 1, our analysis would carry over to this more general setting. For any fixed Ͻ 1, there exists a bias ␥* that exactly offsets the adjustment and leads to correct beliefs in the long run. From ␥* ϭ ␥*(), a small further increase in the bias must be welfare increasing because the induced distortion in decisions has only a second-order effect on welfare. In other words, if a sophisticated agent moderates his prediction of success on the next attempt to offset the bias in perception, a further bias in perception is welfare increasing.
But in this more general setting, our argument applies even if the bias in perception ␥ is fixed, or if no further bias is possible. For any fixed bias ␥, there exists an adjustment that exactly offsets the bias. From *(␥), a small increase in (that is, less adjustment of the agent's beliefs) is welfare increasing as well. Thus if both the bias ␥ and the adjustment that the agent thinks appropriate tend to evolve in a way that maximizes long-run welfare, then we should expect that the agent underestimates the extent to which the data are biased (hence the overconfidence).
28 Therefore, while in our main model, the decision maker was unaware of the possibility that his data were biased (i.e., ␥ Ͼ 0 but ϭ 1), in this extended model, the agent will be overconfident if he is simply unaware of the extent to which the data are biased (␥ Ͼ ␥*()), a much weaker assumption.
Finally, we wish to point out a simple extension of our model that would generate overconfidence, even if no relationship between p and were imposed. Though we have assumed that confidence depends solely on perceptions, a quite natural assumption would be that confidence also depends on the beliefs of the agent about the likelihood of success, that is,
where both beliefs and perceptions may have a positive effect on confidence. This is a simple extension of our model that would confer instrumental value to beliefs being biased.
D. Related Literature
There is a growing body of literature in economics dealing with overconfidence or confidence management. We now discuss several of these papers and the relation to our work. 27 Whether an adjustment has a large or small effect on performance could, for example, depend on whether the agent can simultaneously hold two somewhat contradictory beliefs-biased perceptions and unbiased, or less biased beliefs. This ability is clearly welfare enhancing. 28 Depending on the shape of , more sophistication (i.e., ␥ Ͻ 1) need not be welfare increasing. 29 More generally, our insight could be applied to psychological games (see, e.g., John Geanakoplos et al., 1989, and Rabin, 1993) . In these games, beliefs affect utilities, so if agents have some (possibly limited) control over their attributional styles, they should learn to bias their beliefs in a way that increases welfare, and in the long run, we should not expect beliefs to be correct. Our analysis thus questions whether the standard assumption that beliefs should be correct in equilibrium is a valid one.
One important modelling aspect concerns the treatment of information. In Roland Benabou and Jean Tirole (2002) and Botund Koszegi (2000) , the agent tries to assess how able he is, in a purely Bayesian way: he may actively decide to forget selectively some negative experiences (Benabou and Tirole) or stop recording any further signal (Koszegi) , but he is perfectly aware of the way information is processed and properly takes it into account when forming beliefs. Thus beliefs are not biased on average; only the distribution over posterior beliefs is affected (which is why referring to confidence management rather than overconfidence may be more appropriate to describe this work). Another notable difference is our focus on long-run beliefs. For agents who in the long run have a precise estimate of their ability, the Bayesian assumption implies that this estimate must be the correct one (with probability close to 1). So in this context, confidence management essentially has only temporary effects.
Concerning the treatment of information, our approach is closer in spirit to that of Rabin and Schrag (1999) . They analyze a model of "confirmatory bias" in which agents form first impressions and bias future observations according to these first impressions. In forming beliefs, agents take their "observations" at face value, without realizing that their first impressions biased what they believed were their "observations." Rabin and Schrag then focus on how this bias affects beliefs in the long run and find that on average the agent is overconfident, that is, on average, he puts more weight than a Bayesian observer would on the alternative he deems most likely. A notable difference with our work is that in their case the bias has no instrumental value.
Another important aspect concerns the underlying reason why information processing biases may be welfare enhancing. In Michael Waldman (1994) or Benabou and Tirole (2002) , the benefit stems from the fact that the agent's criterion for decision making does not coincide with welfare maximization, while in Koszegi, the benefit stems from beliefs being directly part of the utility function. 30 Waldman (1994) analyzes an evolutionary model in which there may be a divergence between private and social objectives. He considers a model of sexual inheritance of traits (no disutility of effort/disutility of effort; correct assessment of ability/overconfidence), in which fitness would be maximized with no disutility of effort and correct assessment of ability. Disutility of effort leads to a divergence between the social objective (offspring) and the private objective (utility). As a result, individuals who possess the trait "disutility of effort" have higher fitness if they are overconfident (because this induces greater effort).
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In Benabou and Tirole (2002) , the criterion for decision making also diverges from (ex ante) welfare maximization. Benabou and Tirole study a two-period decision problem in which the agent has time-inconsistent preferences. As a consequence of this time inconsistency, the decision criterion in the second period does not coincide with ex ante welfare maximization, and biased beliefs in this context may induce decisions that are better aligned with welfare maximization.
To illustrate formally why a divergence between private objectives and welfare gives instrumental value to biased beliefs, assume that in our model, performance is independent of beliefs, but that the agent undertakes the activity only when (4.1) p Ͼ ␤c with ␤ Ͼ 1.
One interpretation is that the agent lacks the will to undertake the risky activity, and that he undertakes it only when its expected return exceeds 1 by a sufficient amount.
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30 See Larry Samuelson (2004) for another example of a model in which an incorrectly specified decision criterion leads to welfare enhancing biases, and Hanming Fang (2001) and Aviad Heifetz and Yossi Spiegel (2001) for examples of models where, in a strategic context, beliefs are assumed to be observable, hence directly affect opponents' reactions. 31 Waldman's (1994) main insight is actually stronger: he shows that the trait "disutility of effort," and hence the divergence between private and social objectives, may actually persist: the combination of disutility of effort and overconfidence in ability can be evolutionarily stable. The reason is that for individuals who possess the trait "overconfidence," disutility of effort is optimal, so the combination disutility of effort and overconfidence in ability is a local maximum for fitness (only one trait may change at a time).
32 This formulation can actually be viewed as a reduced form of the agent's decision problem in Benabou and Tirole Given this criterion for making the decision whether to undertake the risky activity or not, we may write expected welfare as a function of the bias ␥. We obtain:
Hence wЈ(␥) has the same sign as Ϫ [ ␥ ()/␤], and is positive at ␥ ϭ 0 (correct beliefs), since 0 () ϭ and ␤ Ͼ 1. Intuitively, biased beliefs allow the agent to make decisions that are better aligned with welfare maximization.
Finally, Eric Van den Steen (2002) provides another interesting model of overconfidence that explains why most agents would in general believe they have higher driving ability than the average population. Unlike some of the work mentioned above, this overconfidence does not stem from biases in information processing but from the fact that agents do not use the same criterion to evaluate their strength.
We first assume that the equation
has a unique solution, denoted *. We wish to show that in the long run the perception gets concentrated around *. Formally, we will show that for any Ͼ 0, 33 lim t Pr͕ t ʦ ͓* Ϫ , * ϩ ͔͖ ϭ 1.
Our proof builds on a large deviation result in statistics. The proof of this result, as well as that of the Corollary that builds on it, are in Appendix B.
LEMMA 1: (large deviations) Let X 1 , ... , X n be n independent random variables, and let S ϭ ¥ i X i .
For any x Ͼ m , we have
, where ␤ is interpreted as a salience for the present. To see why, assume that (i) there are three periods, (ii) the decision to undertake the activity is made in period 2; (iii) the benefits are enjoyed in period 3; and (iv) there is no discounting. The salience for the present has the effect of inflating the cost of undertaking the activity in period 2, hence induces a divergence from ex ante welfare maximization (that would prescribe undertaking the activity whenever p Ͼ c).
Besides, for any x Ͼ m , h(x, S) Ͼ h 0 for some h 0 Ͼ 0 that can be chosen independently of n.
To assess how the perception evolves from date t to date t ϩ T, we derive below bounds on the number of outcomes N and the number of successes S that are recorded during that period of time. These bounds will be obtained as a Corollary of Lemma 1.
Formally, consider the random variable ỹ t which takes value 0 or 1 depending on whether the outcome is failure or a success, and the random variable z t which takes value 1 or 0 depending on whether the agent is (or is not) subject to a perception bias at t (the outcome is not recorded in the event y t ϭ 0, z t ϭ 1). Now consider a sequence of T projects undertaken at date t, ... , t ϩ T Ϫ 1, and suppose that performance at any of these dates is bounded above by . The numbers S of recorded success and N of recorded outcomes are respectively S ϭ ¥ iϭ0 TϪ1 ỹ t ϩ i and
COROLLARY 2: Assume t ϩ i Յ for all i ʦ {0, ... , T Ϫ 1}. Then for any small x Ͼ 0, there exists h Ͼ 0 that can be chosen independently of T such that
Corollary 2 implies that when perceptions remain below , so that performance remains bounded above by (), then the ratio of recorded successes S/N cannot exceed () by much. Convergence to * will then result from the fact that as long as exceeds *, () is below . More precisely, since is smooth, since (0) Ͼ 0 and (1) Ͻ 1, and since (4.2) has a unique solution, we have:
In words, when current perceptions exceed * by more than , the adjusted probability of success is below current perceptions by more than ␣. Combining this with Corollary 2, we should expect perceptions to go down after a large enough number of periods. The next Lemma makes this statement precise.
LEMMA 4: Fix Ͼ 0 and ␣ ʦ (0, ) as in Lemma 3, and let ␤ ϭ (␣/2)((1 Ϫ ␥)/2). There exists h Ͼ 0 and t គ Ͼ 0 such that, for any date t 0 Ն t គ, for any T Յ ␤t 0 , and for any Ն * ϩ ,
PROOF:
Let n t 0 ϭ s t 0 ϩ f t 0 . For t គ large enough and t 0 Ն t គ, the event n t 0 Յ (1 Ϫ ␥)t 0 /2 has probability at most equal to exp Ϫ ht 0 for some h independent of t 0 . Consider now the event n t 0 Ͼ (1 Ϫ ␥)t 0 /2. Let S and N be the number of successes and recorded events during {t 0 , ... , t 0 ϩ T Ϫ 1}. We have
During this period of time, t remains below t 0 ϩ T/n 0 , hence below t 0 ϩ ␣/2. It follows that t remains below ( t 0 ϩ ␣/2). We now apply Corollary 2 with x ϭ ␣/4, and choose h accordingly. The event (S/N) Ͻ ( t 0 ϩ ␣/2) ϩ ␣/4 and N Ͼ (1 Ϫ ␥)T/2 thus has probability 1 Ϫ exp Ϫ hT. Under that event (and using Lemma 3), we have (S/N) Ϫ t 0 Ͻ Ϫ␣/4, which implies (using 4.3):
We can now conclude the proof. We will show that for t 0 large enough: (i) for any t 0 Ͼ * ϩ , the perception eventually gets below * ϩ with probability close to 1; and (ii) if t 0 Ͻ * ϩ , then the perception always remains below * ϩ 2 with probability close to 1. (i) This is obtained by iterative application of Lemma 4. We set t k ϭ (1 ϩ ␤)t k Ϫ 1 . So long as t k Ͼ * ϩ , we may apply Lemma 4 and get that t kϩ1 Ͻ t k Ϫ with probability 1 Ϫ exp Ϫ h␤t k , where ϭ ␤ 2 /(2(␤ ϩ 1)). We thus obtain (after at most K ϭ (1 Ϫ *)/ iterations):
Since K and h are independent of t 0 , the right-hand side is arbitrarily close to 1 when t 0 is large.
(ii) Consider the event A s where gets above * ϩ 2 for the first time (after t 0 ) at date s. For any s Ͼ t 0 , choose t s such that (1 ϩ ␤)t s ϭ s. Under the event n t Ͼ (1 Ϫ ␥)t/2, at least (1 Ϫ ␥)t/2(Ն␤t) periods are required for to get from * ϩ to * ϩ 2, so we must have t s Ն * ϩ and we may apply Lemma 4 to obtain
for some h 0 independent of s, which further implies (4.5)
for some h independent of t 0 .
Combining (4.4) and (4.5), we finally obtain lim Pr͕ t Ͻ * ϩ ͖ ϭ 1.
Proving that for any Ͼ 0, lim Pr{ t Ͼ * Ϫ } ϭ 1 can be done similarly.
Generalization
CONVERGENCE:
Our convergence result can be easily generalized to the case where equation (4.2) has a finite number of solutions. To fix ideas, consider the case where there are three solutions denoted, * i , i ϭ 1, 2, 3, with * 1 Ͻ * 2 Ͻ * 3 . While Lemma 3 no longer holds, the following weaker statement does:
For any Ͼ 0, there exists ␣ Ͼ 0 such that for any ʦ (* 1 ϩ , * 2 Ϫ ), and any Ն * 3 ϩ , () Ͻ Ϫ ␣.
Lemma 4 thus applies to any ʦ (* 1 ϩ , * 2 Ϫ 2) or any Ն * 3 ϩ , and convergence results as before from (iterative) application of Lemma 4. For example, if t 0 Յ * 2 Ϫ 2, then with probability 1 Ϫ exp Ϫ ht 0 , t will get below * 1 ϩ and never get back above * 1 ϩ 2.
MONOTONICITY:
To prove our main result (Proposition 1), we used the fact that when ␥ increases, the (unique) solution to equation (4.2) increases as well. When there are several solutions to (4.2), this property does not hold for all solutions. In particular, it does not hold when for the solution * i considered, Ј(* i ) Ͼ 1, as would typically be the case for i ϭ 2. Nevertheless, these solutions are unstable: even if convergence to such unstable solutions occurs with positive probability for some values of ␥, 34 a slightly higher value of ␥ would make these trajectories converge to a higher (and stable) solution.
Intuitively, a higher bias has two effects: (i) it reduces the number of failures that are recorded (failures that would have been recorded under ␥ are not recorded with probability ␥Ј Ϫ ␥), hence it mechanically increases the perception of past success rate t ; (ii) because t increases, there is also an indirect effect through increased confidence: successes are more likely.
Both these effects go in the direction of increasing t , and the first effect alone increases t by a positive factor with probability close to 1. When * 2 (␥Ј) Յ * 2 (␥), trajectories leading to * 2 (␥) when the bias is equal to ␥ must lead (with probability one) to trajectories leading to higher long-run perception when the bias is equal to ␥Ј. The only possible candidate is then * 3 (␥Ј).
Robustness
We next examine the robustness of our result to alternative formulations where performance at date t depends on the sequence of the most recent perceived outcomes, rather than on the summary statistic .
Formally, at any date t at which the project is undertaken, the outcome y t may take two values, and we set y t ϭ 0 or 1 depending on whether the outcome is failure or a success. We consider the possibility that the agent's perception is biased as follows: with probability ␥, a failure is actually perceived as a success. We denote by Y t the history of outcomes, by ŷ t the perceived outcome at t, and by Ŷ t (respectively Ŷ t T ) the history of perceived outcomes (respectively last T perceived outcomes). 35 We assume that performance at t depends on the sequence Ŷ t T , t ϭ ͑Ŷ t T ͒
and that performance at t is increasing in Ŷ t T , that is, there exists a positive number a such that for all histories Ŷ T Ϫ 1 (of length T Ϫ 1),
As in our model, the triplet (, ␤, ␥) induces a probability distribution over beliefs and histories of perceptions. Although performance no longer converges to a point distribution, it is standard to show that Ŷ t T converges to a unique invariant distribution. It is not difficult then to show that the perceived frequency of success, hence beliefs, also converges to some p(␥).
36 Long-run expected welfare may thus be written as:
As in our model, it then follows that starting from ␥ ϭ 0 (where in the long run beliefs are correct and coincide with lim E 0 (Ŷ t T )), a positive bias ␥ Ͼ 0 induces a distortion in decisions that has a 34 Convergence to such unstable solutions cannot be excluded for some values of ␥.
35 Note that we omit dates on which the project is not undertaken, because performance will be assumed to depend only on the sequence of perceived outcomes, and not on the actual date at which these outcomes occurred. Thus, we have Y t ϭ ( y 1 , ... , y t Ϫ 1 ), Ŷ t ϭ ( ŷ 1 , ... , ŷ t Ϫ 1 ),Ŷ t T ϭ Ŷ t for t Յ T, and Ŷ t T ϭ ( ŷ t Ϫ T , ... , ŷ t Ϫ 1 ) for t Ͼ T. 36 Alternatively, we could have assumed that the agent attempts to estimate the probability of success at the next trial, contingent on the last T perceived outcomes (and that these conditional beliefs each get close to the corresponding empirical frequencies). Conditional on Ŷ T , the agent's belief would then converge to some p(␥, Ŷ T ) that coincides with (Ŷ t T ) when there is no bias (␥ ϭ 0). second-order effect on welfare. To show that our result carries over to this setting, we need to check that the increase in ␥ generates a first-order increase in long-run expected performance.
To verify this we consider the two stochastic processes associated respectively with ␥ ϭ 0 and ␥ ϭ ␥ 0 Ͼ 0. Consider a sequence Z ϭ (z t ) tՆ1 where z t ʦ {0, 1} for all t, which captures whether the agent may or may not be subject to a perception bias at t. Formally, we define the function ŷ t ϭ b( y t , z t ) such that ŷ t ϭ 1 if y t ϭ 1 or z t ϭ 1, and ŷ t ϭ 0 otherwise. 37 The function Ŷ t ϭ B t (Y t , Z t ), where Z t denotes the truncated sequence (z 1 , ... , z t Ϫ 1 ) is defined accordingly. The first stochastic process (␥ ϭ 0) corresponds to the case where z t ϭ 0 for all t. The second stochastic process corresponds to the case where (z t ) tՆ1 is a sequence of i.i.d. random variable that takes value 0 with probability 1 Ϫ ␥ 0 and 1 with probability ␥ 0 . Now denote by X ϭ (x t ) tՆ1 a sequence of i.i.d. random variables uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. The outcome at date t can be viewed as a function of Ŷ t and the realization x t , where y t ϭ R t (Ŷ t , x t ) ϭ 1 if x t Ͻ (Ŷ t ), and y t ϭ 0 otherwise. So the outcome Y t ϩ 1 can be viewed as a function of Z t and X t ϩ 1 , say Y t ϩ 1 ϭ S t ϩ 1 (Z t , X t ϩ 1 ). Since B t is non-decreasing in Y t and in Z t , and since R t is non-decreasing in Ŷ t , we obtain (by induction on t) that for all t, S t is non-decreasing in Z t .
For any given realization X of X , let Y t 0 denote the sequence of outcomes that obtains up to date t under the first stochastic process: Y t 0 ϵ S t (0, X t ). For any given realizations (X t , Z t ), the difference between expected performance at t under the two stochastic processes can be written as ͑B t ͑S t ͑Z t Ϫ 1 , X t ͒, Z t ͒͒ Ϫ ͑S t ͑0, X t ͒͒ and since S t is non-decreasing in Z t , this difference is at least equal to
Then a first-order increase in performance would obtain in the long run, because at any date, the event ( y t , z t ) ϭ (0, 1) has positive probability. 
